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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4680 
 ___________ 
 
 DAVID WATTIE-BEY;  
 ALICIA WATTIE, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL‟S OFFICE, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;  
DIVISION FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH SERVICES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-02224) 
 District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
 ____________________________________ 
  
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 31, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 






 Appellants, David Wattie-Bey and Alicia Wattie, filed a pro se complaint in the 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania shortly after a Pennsylvania state 
trial court entered an order authorizing state officials to remove appellants‟ minor child 
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from their home, and directing placement of the child with the Dauphin County Division 
of Children and Youth Services pending further custody proceedings.  Appellants assert 
in their federal complaint that the Dependency Petition presented in state court was 
improper, that it was supported by an inadequate Affidavit, and that it violated their 
federal constitutional rights in several respects.  Further, they contend that the state 
court‟s removal order was improper insofar as it was entered in reliance upon the infirm 
Dependency Petition.  Appellants sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy the alleged violations of their constitutional rights.  
 Upon an initial screening of the complaint, a Magistrate Judge recommended 
granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing the suit for four reasons:  
(1) the complaint violates the “domestic relations doctrine” by asking to “federally 
adjudicate what is a pending state domestic relations matter”; (2) abstention under 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is warranted while the state court custody 
proceedings are pending; (3) the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the named 
defendants (the Pennsylvania Attorney General‟s Office and the Dauphin County 
Division of Children and Youth Services); and (4) to the extent that appellants might seek 
to hold state judicial agency employees personally liable for damages, those employees 
would be immune from such liability.  The District Court fully adopted the Report and 
Recommendation and dismissed the complaint.  Appellants timely filed this appeal. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We will summarily affirm 
a district court‟s judgment when, as here, the appeal presents “no substantial question.”  
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3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The District Court was correct that Younger abstention principles dictated 
dismissal of the complaint, at least with regard to appellants‟ claims for prospective 
injunctive and declaratory relief based on alleged violations of their constitutional rights 
in the ongoing state court custody proceedings.
1
  “We exercise plenary review over the 
legal determination of whether the requirements for abstention have been met.  Once we 
determine that the requirements have been met, we review a district court‟s decision to 
abstain under Younger abstention principles for abuse of discretion.”  Gwynedd 
Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d 1195, 1199 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(citation omitted).   
 The doctrine of Younger abstention “reflects a strong federal policy against 
federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary 
circumstances.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, “[i]n certain circumstances, 
district courts must abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a particular claim where 
resolution of that claim in federal court would offend principles of comity by interfering 
                                                 
1
 With regard to dismissal of the complaint under the “domestic relations doctrine,” 
the United States Supreme Court has long recognized a domestic relations exception 
to federal diversity jurisdiction for cases “„involving the issuance of a divorce, 
alimony, or child custody decree.‟”  Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency, LLC, 
545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 
704 (1992)).  Here, appellants invoke federal question, not diversity, jurisdiction in 
seeking relief under § 1983.  “[A]s a jurisdictional bar, the domestic relations 
exception does not apply to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States.”  Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 308 (3d Cir. 1984); see McLaughlin v. 
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with an ongoing state proceeding.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 
2010) (per curiam).  Younger abstention is appropriate when: “(1) there are ongoing state 
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state 
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal 
claims.”  Gwynedd Properties, 970 F.2d at 1199.   
 These requirements are met here.  First, appellants acknowledged in the complaint 
that proceedings regarding the welfare and custody of their child remained pending in 
state court when they filed suit in federal court.  See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670.  Second, 
“[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern.”  Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 
435 (1979); see also Winston v. Children & Youth Services, 948 F.2d 1380, 1399 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (Garth, J. dissenting) (observing that “Pennsylvania … clearly has a strong 
interest in administering its child welfare procedures and in adjudicating controversies 
that arise from that administration”).  Third, appellants do not appear unable to raise their 
claims and obtain relief in the state proceedings, at least insofar as they seek declaratory 
relief and an injunction against future proceedings due to the alleged constitutional 
infirmity of the Dependency Petition, the trial court‟s removal order, and the custody 
proceedings generally.  See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 670-71 (explaining that Younger 
requires only an opportunity to present federal claims in state court, and the burden rests 
with plaintiff to show that state procedural law bars presentation of the claims).  Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1989).  As such, appellants‟ complaint is not 
subject to dismissal under the domestic relations exception.  
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there is no indication here “of bad faith, harassment or some other extraordinary 
circumstance, which might make abstention inappropriate.”  Anthony v. Council, 316 
F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 The record, therefore, supports the District Court‟s decision to abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction over the complaint.  However, inasmuch as appellants seek to 
recover damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights, we have observed 
that “a district court, when abstaining from adjudicating a claim for injunctive relief, 
should stay and not dismiss accompanying claims for damages … when such relief is not 
available from the ongoing state proceedings.”  Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-
45 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  As we have explained, 
“Younger abstention is only appropriate where the precise claims raised in federal court 
are available in the ongoing state proceedings.  Where the availability of a claim in state 
court is questionable, our abstention jurisprudence weighs in favor of retaining 
jurisdiction.”  Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 413 (3d Cir. 
2005).  
 Nevertheless, it is clear that appellants‟ damages claims were properly dismissed 
rather than stayed because, as the Magistrate Judge explained, the two defendants that 
appellants elected to name in this suit are entitled to sovereign immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment.   
 Appellants seek to recover for the alleged violations of their constitutional rights 
from the Pennsylvania Attorney General‟s Office and the Dauphin County Division of 
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Children and Youth Services.  “[T]he Eleventh Amendment . . . has been interpreted to 
render states -- and, by extension, state agencies and departments and officials when the 
state is the real party in interest -- generally immune from suit by private parties in 
federal court.”  Pa. Fed‟n of Sportsmen‟s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 
2002).  In addition, “States are not „persons‟ within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, 
cannot be among those held liable for violations of the civil rights statute.”  Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1996).  For the reasons explained by 
the Magistrate Judge, appellants‟ claims against the state agencies named as defendants 
are precluded under the Eleventh Amendment.
2
  Consequently, their claims for damages 
were properly dismissed rather than stayed.
3
   
 For foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court‟s judgment 
dismissing appellants‟ complaint.   
                                                 
2
 While “[t]he Supreme Court has long held that counties, municipalities, and political 
subdivisions of a state are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment,” Febres v. 
Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 229 (3d Cir. 2006), the Magistrate Judge 
observed that Pennsylvania‟s domestic relations agencies, such as the Dauphin 
County Division of Children and Youth Services, are defined by statute as arms of the 
state courts and institutions of state government. 
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 The Magistrate Judge also concluded that appellants‟ complaint fails against any 
individual defendants that might be named because such individual defendants would 
be entitled to immunity for official actions undertaken in the state judicial system.  
Appellants, however, did not name any individual defendants to this suit.  
Consequently, we do not find it appropriate or necessary to address the potential 
immunity of unspecified individuals not named as defendants to the suit. 
